Robert L. Frazier v. East Millard Recreation District : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1982
Robert L. Frazier v. East Millard Recreation District
: Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Harold D. Mitchell; Strong & Mitchell; Attorneys for Appellant;
Eldon A. Eliason; Attorney for Respondent;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Frazier v. East Millard Recreation District, No. 18201 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2871
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. FRAZIER, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-v-
EAST MILLARD RECREATION 
DISTRICT, 
Defendant-Repsondent. 
Case No. 18201 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from Judgment of Fifth Judicial District Court 
of Millard County, 
Honorable J. Harlan Burns, District Judge, Presiding 
****************************** 
ELDON A. ELIASON 
Attorney for Respondent 
Delta, Utah 84632 
HAROLD D. MITCHELL 
STRONG & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Appellant 
197 South Main Street 
Springville, Utah 84663 
F' LED 
APR 301982 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. FRAZIER, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
EAST MILLARD RECREATION ) 
DISTRICT, ) 
) 
Defendant-Respondent. } 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 18201 
Appeal from Judgment of Fifth Judicial District Court 
of Millard County, 
Honorable J. Harlan Burns, District Judge, Presiding 
*********************** 
ELDON A. ELIASON 
Attorney for Respondent 
Delta, Utah 84632 
HAROLD D. MITCHELL 
STRONG & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Appellant 
19·7 South Main Street 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF CASE . . . . . . 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL . • 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 
ARGUMENT 
I: DISMISSAL OF THE CASE WAS AN ABUSE OF 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION . . . . . . . 2 
II: DISMISSAL OF THE LITIGATION WAS-CON-
TRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF RULES 5(a) AND 
4l(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 5 
III: DISMISSAL OF THE CASE WITHOUT NOTICE 
AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD IS A DEPRI-
VATION OF PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW . . . . . . • . . . . 7 
IV: ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WAS 
IN VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF PRACTICE 8 
SUMMARY 10 
CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED 
Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23, 60 
ALR2d 1354 (1956) . . . . 3 
Christiansen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 163 P.2d 
314 ( 1945) . . . . . . . . . 8 
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 
4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960). . . . . . . . 8 
Johnson v. Firebrand, 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1977) 5, 7 
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 91 
S.Ct. 499, 27 L.Ed.2d 532 (1971) . . . . 8 
McGrew v. Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 203, 
85 P.2d 608 (1938) . ~ . . . . . • . . . 7 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AUTHORITIES (Continued) 
McFarlan v. Fowler Bank City Trust Co., 214 Ind. 
O, 12 N.E.2d 752 (1938) ...•...• 
Polk v. Ivers, 561 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1977) 
Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 
19 7 7) . . . . . . . 
Vernon V. State, 245 Ala. 633, 18 So.2d 388 
(1944) . . • . . . . . •.•. 
Fifth Judicial District Court Special Rules 
United States Constitution, Amendment 14 
Utah Constitution, Article I, §7 
Utah Constitution, Article I I §11 . 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 5 (a) . 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 41 (b) 
Utah Rules of Practice in District Courts and 
Circuit Courts, Rule 2.9 . . . . . . 
Page 
3 
5, 7 
5, 7 
8 
6 
7 
7 
8 
6 
6, 7 
8' 9 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a contract action by an architect for fees 
due from defendant for work done prior to cancellation of 
the written contract between the parties. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was dismissed with prejudice before trial 
and with no motion for dismissal or other hearing. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the District Court's 
judgment of dismissal and a remand of the case for trial 
or other appropriate proceedings so that a resolution may 
be made of the issues presented in the action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was brought by plaintiff, an architect 
licensed by the State of Utah, for collection of an amount 
claimed to be due under a written contract for architectural 
services with East Millard Recreation District. Plaintiff 
requested that the matter be set for trial and a pretrial 
hearing was held in the District Court on March 17, 1981. 
No pretrial order was entered and counsel was instructed 
that a pretrial order would be held in abeyance (Transcript 
March 17, 1981, hearing, page 7). At the conclusion of the 
pretrial conference, both parties were given leave to file 
motions for summary judgment within 20 days (Transcript, 
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pp. 6-7). Neither party did so. The matter was placed on 
the monthly law and motion calendar in Millard County for 
July 14, 1981, (Record p. 18) without notice to either 
party. No one appeared and the case was continued. On 
September 1, 1981, counsel for plaintiff called the court's 
attention to the case by letter requesting a trial date 
(Record p. 23} . The matter was again placed on the Millard 
County law and motion calendar for September 15, 1981, 
(Transcript September 15, 1981, hearing; Record p. 19), 
again without notice to counsel and again neLther party 
appeared. At that time the court ruled that the case 
should be dismissed with prejudice. On November 24, 1981, 
counsel for plaintiff received from the trial court admin-
istrators a notice of a trial in the matter set for April 
21, 1982 (Record p. 22) although that notice was apparently 
not filed by the administrator with the county clerk and is 
not part of the record. On December 2, 1981, the court 
signed a judgment of dismissal which had been prepared by 
counsel for defendant (Record p. 20). A copy of that judg-
ment was mailed by the clerk's office to counsel for plain-
tiff and was received by him on December 22, 1981 (Record 
p. 22) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: DISMISSAL OF THE CASE WAS AN ABUSE OF THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DISCRETION. 
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Discretion, by its very nature, is difficult of 
precise definition and to precisely classify it is a diff-
icult undertaking. The standard for determining whether 
a court has abused its discretion is not a hard and fast 
rule. Abuse of discretion "arises from action beyond the 
bounds of fair discretion, exceeding the bounds of reason. 
It has been defined as 'an erroneous conclusion and judg-
ment, one clearly against the logic and effect of the facts 
and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, 
probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.'" 
Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23, 60 ALR2d 1354 
at 1365 (1956), citing McFarlan v. Fowler Bank City Trust 
Co., 214 Ind. 10, 12 N.E.2d 752, 754. Abuse of discretion 
does not necessarily imply a dishonest motive or act but 
only that the trial court made an unreasonable ruling. 
The ruling of the trial court to dismiss plaintiff's 
action with prejudice is plainly an abuse of discretion 
under the standard as set forth above. The reasons given 
by the court in its September 15, 1981, ruling from the 
bench show that the court's discretion was abused. The 
court dismissed the case for "failure of counsel for plain-
tiff to submit a pretrial order", for failure to submit 
briefs, for failure to file motions for summary judgment, 
because "both parties have abandoned their lawsuit", and 
because "there is no legal entity, East Millard Recreation 
District" (Transcript, September 15, 1981, pp. 1-2). None 
-1-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of these reasons is an adequate justification for the 
court's judgment of dismissal. First, counsel for plain-
tiff was specifically directed at the pretrial hearing 
that the pretrial order would be held in abeyance (Trans-
cript, March 17, 1981, p. 7). Second, filing of briefs 
was discretionary with counsel or was replaced by the grant-
ing of leave to file motions for summary judgment (Transcript, 
March 17, 1981, pp. 5-7}. In any event, neither party filed 
such a brief. Plaintiff should not be the only party pun-
ished for any such failure. Third, the court at no time 
required counsel to submit motions for summary judgment but 
only granted leave to do so within a specific time (Transcript, 
March 17, 1981, pp. 6-7}. Fourth, plaintiff had certainly 
not abandoned the litigation but was waiting for the matter 
to be set for trial so that the issues presented by the com-
plaint could be resolved. Plaintiff had requested a trial 
setting. In fact, with no knowledge that the matter was even 
on the court's law and motion calendar for September 15, 1981, 
plaintiff's counsel wrote to the court on September 1, 1981, 
to remind the court that the matter should be set for trial 
(Record p. 23). The court knew, or should have known that 
plaintiff was still pursuing the matter. Fifth, the existence 
or non-existence of a legal entity known as East Millard 
Recreation District is one of the fundamental issues of the 
litigation and cannot be resolved by the court in such an 
offhand manner. It involves factual questions on which the 
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court has as yet heard no evidence. 
Plaintiff had certainly not failed to prosecute his 
case. Plaintiff had requested a trial setting, had attended 
the pretrial conference, and then had waited approximately 
4 1/2 months after the court's discretionary period for filing 
motions for summary judgment before reminding the court that 
the case still needed to bet set for trial. That certainly 
is not a failure to prosecute so as to justify the court's 
dismissal of the action. This Court has ruled that to dismiss 
an action after much longer delays than that was an abuse of 
discretion. Polk v. Ivers, 561 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1977); Utah 
Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977); Johnson v. 
Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1977). 
Furthermore, plaintiff's counsel cannot be expected to 
appear at any hearing of which he has received no notice. 
In spite of the recitation to the contrary in the judgment 
of dismissal (Record p. 20) , no order to show cause nor any 
other notice was served upon plaintiff's counsel and the 
record does not reflect that any such notice was given. To 
act without such notification to counsel is the worst abuse 
of the court's discretion. That action violates all standards 
of justice and fair play which our judicial system is to 
guarantee. 
POINT II: DISMISSAL OF THE LITIGATION WAS CONTRARY TO THE 
PROVISIONS OF RULES S(a) AND 4l(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
-5-
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PROCEDURE. 
Rule 4l(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
specifies when a matter may be dismissed. Such a dismissal 
with prejudice may be granted to defendant only upon defen-
dant's motion for one of three grounds: failure of pl~intiff 
to prosecute, failure of plaintiff to comply with the Rules 
of Civil Procedure, or failure to obey any order of court. 
There was no such motion made by defendant in this action, 
or at least it does not appear in the record. If such a 
motion was made, it did not comply with Rule 5(a). The latter 
rule requires that notices and motions be in writing and be 
served upon all parties. The record shows that no such ser-
vice was made on counsel for plaintiff. In fact, there was 
no notice at all of hearings held July 14, 1981, and Septem-
ber 15, 1981. 
Nor can plaintiff be charged with notice of the hearings 
under the Fifth Judicial District's special rule which reads: 
"Motions on file five days prior to a motion day are consid-
ered set for hearing without notice on such motion day, unless 
request is made for a later hearing." In this case, there 
was no motion pending and therefore no reason for the case to 
be on the monthly law and motion calendar without notice to 
the parties. 
Even if the court has authority under Rule 4l(b) or 
some other inherent authority to dismiss the case without a 
motion by defendant, it, too, must comply with Rule 5(a) and 
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give notice to plaintiff. That rule, by its own terms, is 
as binding upon the court as on an adverse party. In addi-
tion, the dismissal with prejudice must be based on one of 
the grounds specified in Rule 4l(b}. As shown under Point 
I above, plaintiff had not failed to prosecute his case. 
Polk v. Ivers, supra; Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, supra; Johnson 
v. Firebrand, Inc., supra. There has been no violation by 
plaintiff of the Rules of Civil Procedure nor has plaintiff 
violated any order of court. There is no justification 
under the rule for the dismissal. 
POINT III: DISMISSAL OF THE CASE WITHOUT NOTICE AND AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD IS A DEPRIVATION OF PLAINTIFF'S 
PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
The United States Constitution, Amendment 14, provides 
that no state "shall. .. deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law .... " The Utah 
Constitution, Article I, §7, contains a similar provision: 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law." Plaintiff's right under the 
contract for architectural services to receive compensation 
for his services is a property right and as such is entitled 
to protection under these constitutional provisions. McGrew 
v. Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 203, 85 P.2d 608 (1938}. 
The action of the court in dismissing the action is a 
clear violation of procedural due process to which plaintiff 
-7-
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is entitled. Due process involves notice of the proceeding, 
an opportunity to be heard, and the rudimentary require-
ments of fair play. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 
91 S.Ct. 499, 27 L.Ed.2d 532 (1971); Hannah v. Larche, 363 
U.S. 420, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960); Vernon v. 
State, 245 Ala. 633, 18 So.2d 388 (1944). The record is 
clear that no notice was given to plaintiff, that there was 
no opportunity to be heard, and that the court made an arbi-
trary decision with no grounds therefor. Plaintiff has been 
deprived of his "day in court" which is necessary to accord 
due process. Christ1ansen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 163 P.2d 
314 ( 1945) . 
The trial court also violated Article I, §11 of the 
Utah Constitution which requires: "All courts shall be open, 
and every person, for an injury done to him in his ... 
property ..• shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay .... " 
By its arbitrary action, the trial court has closed itself to 
plaintiff and denied him his remedy by due course of law. 
POINT IV: ENTRY OF THE JUPGMENT OF DISMISSAL WAS IN VIOLATION 
OF THE RULES OF PRACTICE. 
Rule 2.9(a) of the Rules of Practice in the District 
Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah requires that 
an order be prepared and submitted to the court within fifteen 
days of a ruling. In this matter the ruling was made on 
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September 15, 1981 (Transcript, September 15, 1981) but 
no formal order was submitted for more than two months. 
The Judgment of Dismissal (Record p. 20) was not signed by 
the court until December 2, 1981, and was not filed in the 
clerk's office until December 8, 1981. During that entire 
period of time, counsel had absolutely no notice that the 
case had been dismissed or even had been on the court's cal-
endar for any type of hearing. 
Entry of the judgment also violated Rule 2.9(b) of the 
Rules of Practice. That rule requires a proposed order to 
be submitted to opposing counsel before being presented to 
the court. Counsel for plaintiff did not receive a copy of 
the order prior to its filing with the clerk, let alone 
before it was presented to the judge. Neither the judgment 
itself (Record p. 20) nor any other part of the record show 
that the rule had been complied with. It was error on the 
part of the court to execute the order without a mailing 
certificate showing that counsel for defendant had furnished 
a copy to counsel for plaintiff. ~t was also error for coun-
sel for defendant to submit the order to the court with no 
notice to opposing counsel. Plaintiff's counsel was thus 
' I denied the right and opportunity to object to the obvious 
errors contained in the order: (1) It was not made after an 
order to show cause. None was served and no such order 
appears in the record. (2) It was not made after a regular 
hearing. Plaintiff had been given no notice of the hearing. 
-9-
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(3) It does not reflect that no one representing defendant 
appeared at the hearing. 
SUMMARY 
Dismissal of the case by the District Court was an 
abuse of the court's discretion and was done in violation 
of rule and constitution. The dismissal should be reversed 
and the matter remanded to the trial court so that plaintiff 
may have an opportunity to present his case at a trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
t;J_~ C[). I~ 
Harold D. Mitchell 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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